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This is a case study of a small Indigenous community in Guatemala that
defied a powerful Canadian mining company by holding a community vote
on whether to allow mining on its territory. The result of the vote to stop
mining activity on its territory has not been honoured by the Canadian
mining company. The dispute is being played out against a backdrop of
intimidation and violence. The study reviews the major players in the
dispute the mining company, the Guatemalangovernment, the World Bank
and the Canadiangovernment-and concludes that they all have a stake in
the profitability of the mine. There is a clear deficiency in the checks and
balances needed to ensure that the Indigenous people are dealt with fairly.
Drawing on ideas from the National Roundtables on Corporate Social
Responsibility ("CSR") and the CanadianExtractive Industry in Developing
Countries (released in March 2007), the study suggests that at the present
time, Canadiancourts may be the only forum capable of holding the major
actors accountablefor their actions.

I

INTRODUCTION

In the pages that follow we will describe a dispute between the Canadian
mining company, Glamis Gold (now Goldcorp)1 and the Indigenous people
in the San Marcos district of Guatemala. This is a case study conceived after
visits to Guatemala by Shin Imai in 2004 and a summer spent in the San
Marcos area by Ladan Mehranvar in 2005. It would be fair to say that we
were both taken aback by what we saw and what we have learned since.'
Glamis Gold ("Glamis") began preliminary work on the open pit gold
mine in 1999. Indigenous people raised concerns soon after about the
environmental impacts, including the controversial use of cyanide to extract

I.

2.

In November 2006, Goldcorp Inc. merged with Glamis in a $21.3 billion transaction. The CEO
of Glamis, Kevin McArthur, became the CEO of Goldcorp. In the rest of this article, we will
refer to Glamis when there is a reference to historical events involving Glamis. When we are
dealing with more contemporary issues, we will refer to Goldcorp. See Jane Wemiuk, "The
New-Look Goldcorp" (June 2007), online: <http://www.canadianminingjoumal.com/issues/
ISarticle.asp?id-188471 &story id-31989103454&issue-06012007&PC->.
One of Ladan's first emails from San Marcos began, "For the first time in my life I truly felt
ashamed of being Canadian."
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the gold. We will touch on the environmental issues, but the focus of this
paper is on a different aspect of the dispute: the right of the Indigenous
people in the area to control development on their territory. We will discuss
the exercise of Indigenous law by the community of Sipacapa; the
application of the domestic laws of Guatemala; and the relevance of
international norms, such as the International Labor Organization's
Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention (No. 169). We will see the role
that the World Bank and the Canadian embassy have played in financing and
supporting Glamis Gold. We will end with some observations on the
importance of establishing an independent, effective accountability
mechanism to monitor the relationship between Canadian extractive
industries and Indigenous peoples.
In order to understand the perilous situation of Indigenous people in
Guatemala today, it is necessary to briefly review the past. This history
begins with the CIA-sponsored coup in 1954 and takes us through the dark
period of a civil war when Canadian mining giant INCO was opening a mine
in Guatemala. During and after this period, the Guatemalan government
committed genocide of groups of Mayan people. There was a restoration of a
fragile democracy in 1985 and a Peace Accord signed with guerillas in 1996.
The story of Glamis Gold begins at around the same time as the release of a
report by Bishop Juan Jos6 Gerardi on the brutalities committed by the
Guatemalan government.

II

FOREIGN INTERESTS AND GUATEMALAN HISTORY

Guatemala is a country that is predominantly Indigenous. It has 24 language
groups with 52 distinct languages.' About 60 per cent of the population
identifies itself as Indigenous and continues to wear their traditional dress
and speak their own languages. Anyone going to the highlands of Guatemala
is immediately struck by the vibrancy of the culture. It is likely that a much
higher percentage of the population is actually Indigenous, but does not
identify as such. Being Indigenous is a bar to "getting ahead." 4
Although Indigenous people have survived in Guatemala, it has been a
precarious existence. Guatemalan society has historically been dominated by
a small group of descendants of Spanish settlers who have been allied with

3.
4.

Raymond G. Gordon Jr., ed., Ethnologue: Languages of the World, 15th ed. (Dallas: SIL
International, 2005).
Rachel Sieder, "The Judiciary and Indigenous Rights in Guatemala" (2007) 5:2 Int'l J. Const.
L. 211 at 240 [Sieder, "Guatemala Judiciary"]. Sieder refers to the "innate racism" that
pervades most of Guatemalan society as a reason that the judiciary has not taken a "proactive
role in defense of [I]ndigenous rights."
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the military and foreign interests. In 1951, when populist president Jacobo
Arbenz took office, he began land reforms which would have appropriated
uncultivated land from private companies and returned it to peasant
farmers.5 The powerful United Fruit Company was one of the private
interests affected. Despite receiving adequate compensation for the land, the
United Fruit Company sought the assistance of the United States
government to stop these reforms, accusing Arbenz and his government of
being communists. 6 With the financial and military backing of the CIA,
Castillo Armas invaded Guatemala from Honduras in 1954.' Armas'
leadership favoured foreign investment and reversed the many beneficial
social reforms that had been developed under Arbenz. 8
Repression and economic disparity grew even more severe over the
following years and guerilla armies were established, made up largely of
Indigenous people. A civil war began in 1960. It was a brutal, one-sided war.
The guerillas were no match for the American armed and trained
Guatemalan military. 9 Over 200,000 people were killed or went missing and
a million people were displaced.' ° Of the 42,275 registered acts of violence,
85 per cent of the killings were committed by the Guatemalan army, either
acting alone or with other forces.'' One of the gruesome tactics employed by
the army was a campaign to massacre Indian villages. The atrocities that
were committed during these massacres included the amputation of limbs,
killing of children, victims being burned alive, and the removal of organs
from live victims.12

5.

Laura Moye, "The United States Intervention in Guatemala' (1998) 73:1 & 2 Int'l Social
Science Rev. 44 at 45.
6. Ibid.
7.
Ibid. at44.
8. Ibid.
9.
Andrew J. Schlewitz, "Imperial Incompetence and Guatemalan Militarism, 1931-1966" (2004)
17:4 Int'l J. Politics, Culture and Society 585 at 600. Ironically, both Arbenz and Armas were
graduates of a U.S.-directed military training program.
10. Guatemalan Commission for Historical Clarification (CEH), Guatemala: Memory of Silence,
online:, American Association for the Advancement of Science ("AAAS"), Science and
Human Rights Program <http://shr.aaas.org/guatemala/ceh/report/english/toc.html> [CEH
Report (1999)]; Patrick Ball, Paul Kobrak & Herbert Spirer, "State Violence in Guatemala,
1960-1996: A Quantitative Reflection" (Washington, D.C.: American Association for the
Advancement of Science, 1999), online: AAAS <http://shr.aaas.org/guatemala/ciidh/qr/
english/en qr.pdf>.
11. CEH Report (1999), ibid. at <http://shr.aaas.org/guatemala/ceh/report/english/graphics/charts/
page86.gif>.
12. Ibid. at <http://shr.aaas.org/guatemala/ceh/report/english/conc2.html>; Rigoberta Menchu, 1,
Rigoberta Menchfi: An Indian Woman in Guatemala (London: Verso, 1994). In her book,
Rigoberta Menchu recounts in detail the torture and murder of her brother and mother at the
hands of the military. Menchu received the Nobel Peace Prize in 1992 for her advocacy of
Indian rights in Guatemala and the Western hemisphere.
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The Canadian mining company, INCO first became involved in
Guatemala in 1960, when it created the subsidiary Exmibal with the U.S.based Hanna Mining Company. 3 After negotiations with the government,
Exmibal was granted a 40-year concession to exploit the El Estor region in
August 1966.14 INCO's involvement in Guatemala was part of a corporate
strategy to maintain its position in the world nickel market by investing
heavily in foreign ventures."
There was strong opposition to the Exmibal project from Indigenous
people and other concerned Guatemalans. A group of professors from the
School of Economic Sciences at the University of San Carlos, Guatemala
City, took up the cause and established a commission in 1969.6 The
commission concluded that the Guatemalan government had not negotiated
enough benefits from the project and that Exmibal would simply strip
Guatemala of its riches. 7
Public protests against the mine followed. President Arana responded
by suspending the constitutional right to assembly and arresting large
numbers of people. The army even occupied the university, in its attempt to
silence the opposition from the nation's intellectual community. Two law
professors and members of the commission, Julio Carney Herrera and
Adolfo Mijangos L6pez, were assassinated by state death squads.18
In February, 1971, an exploitation agreement was signed between INCO
and the Guatemalan government.' 9 Because of Guatemala's desire for
income from its deposits of metals and minerals,2" INCO played an
influential role in the country. Bradbury alleges that INCO assisted in
drafting a new Guatemalan mining code in 1973 favourable to INCO's
interests." In 1980, the Guatemalan government scrapped their plan to
increase taxation due to strong opposition from foreign businesses in
Guatemala, including INCO.22
The Canadian public did not appear to take much notice of the
assassinations associated with Exmibal in 1969. However, there was an
13.

J.H. Bradbury, "International Movements and Crises in Resource Oriented Companies: The
Case of Inco in the Nickel Sector" (1985) 61:2 Economic Geography 129 at 138.
14. Ibid.; Steven L. Driever, "The Role in Lateritic Nickel Mining in Latin American Countries
with Special Reference to Exmibal in Guatemala" (1985) 11:1 GeoJournal 29 at 34.
15. Bradbury, ibid.
16. Ibid.
17. Driever, supra note 14 at 36.
18. Ball, supra note 10 at 18; Bradbury, supranote 13 at 138.
19. Driever, supra note 14 at 34.
20. "Guatemala Keen to Get INCO Deal" Toronto Star (15 January 1971) 17.
21. Bradbury, supra note 13 at 138.
22. Arthur Moses, "Proposed Tax Law Endangers Future of INCO Operation" The Globe and Mail
(15 December 1980) 10; Arthur Moses, "INCO Spared Tax Reform on Ore in Guatemala" The
Globe and Mail (27 December 1980) 14.
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outcry about a decade later when the Canadian Export Development
Corporation provided INCO with a $20 million loan for the Guatemala
project.2' At the same time INCO was cutting jobs in Canada.24
Only three years after production started the mine was mothballed due
to the declining market value of nickel and rising oil costs." During this
same period, the most serious human rights violations were occurring at the
hands of the dictator Rios Montt. There were 192 massacres in 1982 alone.26
Despite condemning these human rights violations in Guatemala in 1983, the
Canadian government was in negotiations to sell military planes to the
Guatemalan air force." The Guatemalan military had been known to use
their planes to shoot at Indian villages.28
In 1983, General Oscar Humberto Mejia Victores overthrew Rios Montt
and promoted the return of a democratic system in Guatemala. 29 The first
civilian president in 15 years was elected in 1985. 30 However, the military
still retained much of its power and massacres of Indigenous villagers
continued well into the 1990s. 31 The military also silenced individual critics,
among them, anthropologist Myrna Mack Chang, who had dedicated herself
to identifying the remains of those killed during the civil war and exposing
the military's role in those deaths. She was stabbed to death in 1990.32
In 1996, the Guatemalan government signed a Peace Accord with the
guerrillas. For a moment, there was a promise of a significant transformation
of Guatemalan society. Under the accords, the government would be
compelled to take action on a wide range of subjects including agrarian
reform and rural development; decentralization; social services, such as
health, education, employment, and social security; reform of the
administration system of justice; reform of the military and of the systems of
intelligence of the state; electoral reform; recognition of the rights of
23.
24.
25.
26.

27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

Stephen Lewis, "INCO Strike Leaves Bitter Legacy" Toronto Star (15 April 1979) A20.
Roger Croft, "Safer to Fire Canadians INCO Admits" Toronto Star (29 October 1977) A3
Driever, supranote 14 at 34.
CEH Report (1999), supra note 10;Ball, supra note 10 at21-22. For example, Oliverio
Castafieda de Leen, a member of the University Student Association, was machine gunned to
death in broad daylight in front of hundreds of witnesses including police. The police did not
attempt to chase or arrest the shooters; Oficina de Derechos Humanos del Arzobispado de
Guatemala ("ODHAG"), "Informe para ]a Recuperaci6n de laMemoria Hist6rica: Nunca Mas"
(24 April 1998) at vol. 4, ch. 2, online: ODHAG <http://www.odhag.org.gt/INFREMHI/
Default.htm> ["Nunca Mas"].
Jonathan Lemco, "Canadian Foreign Policy Interests in Central America: Some Current
Issues" (1986) 28:2 J. Interamerican Studies and World Affairs 119 at 123.
Ibid.
Susanne Jonas, The Battle for Guatemala: Rebels, Death Squads, and US Power (Boulder:
Westview Press, 1991) at 153.
Ibid. at 156.
"Nunca Mas", supra note 26.
"International court condemns Guatemala over murder" Reuters Neivs (19 December 2003).
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women; and the integration of populations uprooted and demobilized during
the civil war.3Particularly significant was the Agreement on the Identity and Rights of
Indigenous Peoples34 which established political rights for Mayan people by
redefining Guatemala as a multiethnic, multicultural, and multilingual
nation.35 It also called for the constitutional and legal recognition of Mayan
organizational forms, political practices and customary law. On cultural
rights, the Accord focused on language and cultural "self-determination,"
calling for the creation of representative institutions to defend and strengthen
Mayan culture, and the officialization of all Mayan languages. The section
referring to economic rights focused on land, calling for the restitution of
expropriated communal lands, the immediate titling of lands historically
occupied by Mayan people, and a comprehensive program of land reform.36
It created a formal basis for a new entitlement of Guatemala's Indigenous
majority, a right to make claims upon the state.
Two studies were started to address the abuses committed during the
war. In 1998, Bishop Juan Jos6 Gerardi released the results of evidence and
testimony of 600 people collected from across Guatemala over three years.
His report, Guatemala: Nunca Mas ["Never Again"] stated that over the
course of the civil war, 150,000 people were murdered, 50,000 disappeared
and one million had been displaced.37 Two days after the release of the
report, Bishop Gerardi was beaten to death outside of his home.38 At first,
the police and government authorities attempted to cast the blame on an
attempted robbery, then on a domestic dispute and then an attack by a dog.
After a concerted effort by the Catholic church and international agencies,
individuals connected with the military were charged.3 9 There were death
33.
34.

35.

36.

37.

38.
39.

Luis Pasara, "The Guatemalan Peace Process: The Accords and Their Accomplishments" Kroc
Institute OccasionalPaper (December 2001) at12.
Agreement on Identity and Rights of Indigenous Peoples (31 March 1995), Guat.-URNG, UN
Doc.A/49/882--S/1995/256, (1997), 36 I.L.M. 285, online: United States Institute for Peace
<http://www.usip.org/library/pa/guatemala/guat 950331 .html>.
Hilde Salvesen, "Guatemala: Five Years after the Peace Accords" (Oslo: International Peace
Research Institute, ("PRIO"), March 2002), online: PRIO <http://www.prio.no/files/file44990
guatemala report salvesen.pdf>.
Rachel Sieder, "Reframing Citizenship: Indigenous Rights, Local Power and the Peace Process
in Guatemala" (1997), online: Conciliation Resources <http://www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/
guatemala/reframing-citizenship.php>.
Teo Ballve, "Remembering in the Land that Memory Forgot" NACLA News (14 May 2007),
online: North America Congress on Latin America ("NACLA") <http://news.nacla.org/2007/
05/14/remembering-in-the-land-that-memory-forgot>.
Rachel Sieder, "Coming to Terms with the Past: Remembering and Forgetting in Guatemala"
History Today 55: 9 (September 2005) 28 at 29.
Amnesty International, El Legado Mortal de Guatemala, [The Lethal Legacy of Guatemala]
(2002) at32-37, online: Amnesty International <http://www.amnistiainernacional.org/publica/
ISBN_8486874785.html> [Lethal Legacy].
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threats against witnesses and others involved in the process, and in 2001
both the prosecutor, Leopoldo Zeissig, and the trial judge, Yasmin Barrios,
were forced to flee the country.4"
The promise of reforms to the Constitution that would provide greater
recognition for Indigenous communities never became a reality. The United
Nations had played a strong role in ensuring that rights for Indigenous
people were recognized, but the ruling elite continued to be hostile and had
no incentive to include any changes to the Constitution. A referendum on
constitutional reform was defeated in 1999 after a virulent campaign against
reform organized by elements of the private sector. 4'
In that same year, the United Nations sponsored Commission on
Historical Clarification ("CEH") released its report, Guatemala: Memories
of Silence.42 The CEH found that the state, in some capacity, was responsible
for 93 per cent of the human rights violations that occurred during the war43
and that the state had "committed acts of genocide against groups of the
Maya people."44

III

THE MARLIN PROJECT

It was a few months after the murder of Bishop Gerardi that Glamis Gold, a
Canadian-owned mining company, appeared in Guatemala.45 Glamis'
subsidiary Montana Exploradora was provided with an initial exploration
licence from the Ministry of Energy and Mines in August 1999 for the
Marlin Mine.46
The regions affected by the Marlin project are San Miguel lxtahuacdn
and Sipacapa, both within the San Marcos department of Guatemala. These
communities are largely composed of Indigenous Mayans who speak their
traditional languages, in addition to Spanish.

"Guatemala lawyer flees death threats" BBC News (30 July 2001), online: BBC News
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/1465512.stm>.
41. See Sieder, "Guatemala Judiciary", supra note 4 at 219.
42. United Nations, "Report of the United Nations Verification Mission in Guatemala
("MINUGUA") for the Consultative Group meeting for Guatemala" (18 January 2002) at 2,
online: Inter-American Development Bank <http://www.iadb.org/regions/re2/consultative_
group/gu/minugua eng.pdf>.
43. Ibid.
44. Ibid.
45. Compliance Advisor Ombudsmen ("CAO"), Assessment of a Complaint Submitted to CAO in
Relation to the Marlin Mining Project in Guatemala (7 September 2005) at 3, online: CAO
<http://www.cao-ombudsman.org/pdfs/CAO-Marlin-assessment-English-7SepO5.pdf>
[CAO
Report (2005)].
46. Ibid.
40.
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Glamis first began to meet with municipal officials in San Miguel
lxtahuacdn and Sipacapa areas in 2002. 47 During their exploration activities,
Glamis conducted 30 meetings in San Miguel lxtahuacdn and 17 in Sipacapa
between June and September 2003. According to Glamis, these meetings
attempted to address environmental and other community concerns. Later
that year, Glamis was granted a 25-year exploitation licence for the Marlin
project and received an exploration licence for the Marlin I area from the
Ministry of Energy and Mines. A few months later Glamis also received an
exploration licence for the Marlin 11 area. Construction of the mine began in
May 2004.4' A month later, the Marlin Project received a $45 million dollar
International Finance Corporation ("IFC") loan from the World Bank. 49 The
IFC, which is part of the World Bank, provides loans to companies owned
by the private sector for projects in developing countries. The purpose of this
funding is to encourage competitive markets in developing countries5 while
also improving the social well-being of people within these countries. 1
To acquire the land for the Marlin project, Glamis made land purchases
from individual landowners. Apparently, land was bought from 254
landowners and all transactions were witnessed by municipal staff members.
At the time, Glamis said that no complaints had been raised regarding the
sale of these lands and that all individual land transactions were conducted
successfully. 51 They report that they paid Q 4,000 per cuerda (US $4,567 per
acre) to landowners for land that usually sells for Q 350 to Q 1,500 per
cuerda.52 They also emphasize that the average income in Guatemala is US
$1,670 per year, making their land purchase offers a "fortune" to
landowners.5"

IV

THE INDIGENOUS PEOPLE OF SIPACAPA DECIDE

The two municipalities, Sipacapa and San Miguel Ixtahuacdn, are both
affected by the mine, but 85 per cent of the mine is located in San Miguel
47.

48.
49.

50.
51.
52.

53.

Compliance Advisor Ombudsmen ("CAO"), "Annexes A-D: CAO Assessment" (7 September
2005) at 17, online: CAO <http://www.cao-ombudsman.org/pdfs/CAO-Marlin-assessment
anexes-English-7Sept-05.pdf> ["Annex to CAO Report (2005)"].
Ibid. at21.
"Montana Exploradora: Marlin Gold Proiect", online: The World Bank <http://site
resources.worldbank.org/INTOGMC/Resources/marlinfactsheetenglish.pdf> at I ["Marlin Fact
Sheet"].
"About IFC", online: International Finance Corporation <http://www.ifc.org/about>.
CAO Report (2005), supra note 45 at 26.
Montana Exploradora de Guatemala S.A., "Marlin Mining Proiect Land Acquisition
Procedures" (20 February 2004), online: Goldcorp Inc. <http://www.goldcorp.com/ resources/
proiectpdfs/marlin/landacq.pdf> at 3.
Ibid.
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Ixtahuacdin. Although there was opposition to the mine in both
municipalities, only the municipal council of Sipacapa decided to poll its
own members with respect to the mine.
There are 13 villages within the municipality of Sipacapa. The village
level governance structure includes a community assembly which is part of a
village development council and an elected auxiliary mayor. There is a
larger municipal body which includes representatives of the villages and a
municipal mayor.54 The people who live here speak Sipakapanese, a
language distinct from their Main-speaking neighbours in San Miguel
lxtahuacdin. Most people in the municipalities are subsistence farmers.
The mine had been controversial for some time, with protests in
Sipacapa beginning in February 2004." 5 Residents were concerned about the
environmental impact of the mine but they were also concerned about
mining as a tool of development. They favoured alternative development
proposals controlled by the community." A poll released on November 4,
2004, in San Marcos showed that 95.5 per cent of those surveyed were
against the implementation of the mining project due to fears that the mining
would damage the environment. 5 On November 6, a meeting held in
Sipacapa resulted in a declaration against the mine, stating, among other
things,
We publicly declare at the national and international level, that the granting of
the licence for open pit metal mining violates
the collective rights of the
58
[I]ndigenous peoples who inhabit our territories.

In December, an Indigenous group 150 kilometres away from the mine site
in Solold began a 42-day blockade of Glamis trucks passing through their
community on the way to San Marcos. The blockade ended on January 11,
2005, when more than 1,200 soldiers and 400 police agents began firing at
54.
55.

CAO Report (2005), supra note 45 at 6.
"Annex to CAO Report (2005)", supra note 47 at 21. The first recorded protest event against
the Marlin mine in Sipacapa was in February 2004.
56. "Statement on the IFC-financed Marlin Mine, Guatemala, by Civil Society Organizations" (12
June 2006), online: Bank Information Center <http://www.bicusa.org/Legacy/Statement /20on
%20Marlin%20-%/.2OJune%/202006.pdf>.
57. Prensa Libre, "Rechazan actividad minera en San Marcos: Habitantes de dos municipios
sefialan que explotacion causara dafios al medio ambiente" [Mineral activity rejected in San
Marcos: Residents of the municipalities indicate that exploitation will cause damage to the
environment] (4 November 2004), online: Prensa Libre <http://www.prensalibre.com/pl/2004/
noviembre/04/100844.html>.
58. Declaraci6n Comunitaria Sobre La Licencia de Mineria de Metales a Cielo Abierto En el
Departamentode San Marcos [Community Declarationon the Licence for Open Pit Miningfor
Metals in the Department of San Marcos] (6 November 2004).The Declarationcontained the
seals of 35 organizations, about eighty signatures and a dozen people signing with their
thumbprints.
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the unarmed protesters. Rafil Castro Bocel, an Indigenous farmer, was killed
by the security forces. Twenty others were injured. 9 Glamis blamed the
protests on misinformation spread by anti-mining activists.6" A few weeks
later, Catholic Bishop Alvaro Ramazzini led a 3,000-person protest in San
Marcos, where the mine was located.61
On January 24, 2005, the communities in Sipacapa decided to act. The
municipal council passed the first of three resolutions establishing a
Consulta de Buena Fe ("consulta").62 The process would provide an
opportunity for "the [I]ndigenous authorities, the [I]ndigenous Maya
Sipakapanese population and the residents over 18 years old in the
Municipality of Sipacapa to pronounce in favour or against the mining
activity, exploration and exploitation of minerals in open pit mines. 63 A
commission was established involving the village governance structures and
the municipal council to organize and publicize the consulta. The decision
was to be binding and in force in the territory of Sipacapa.64
During the evening of Sunday, March 13, 2005, there was a choral
concert in the parish church of the municipality of San Miguel Ixtahuacdn,
department of San Marcos. Alvaro Benigno, a man from the village of Pie de

59.

Mining Watch, "Mayan Organisations and Supporters Demand the Closure of the Marlin Mine
in San Marcos, Guatemala", online: Mining Watch <http://www.miningwatch.ca/index.php?
/Guatemala/Close Marlin>; Julio Lara & Edgar Rene Saenz, "Queman autopatrulla-Vecinos
de SololI atacan Policia durante cortejo de muerto en disturbios" (13 January 2005), online:
Prensa Libre <http://www.prensalibre.com/pl/2005/enero/13/105397.html>; "Open Pit Gold
Mining: Human Rights Violations and Environmental Destruction-The Case of the Marlin
Gold Mine" FoodFirstInformation andAction Netiwork ("FIAN")(September 2005) at 3.
60. Glamis Gold, Press Release, "Glamis Gold Comments on Transport Incident" (13 January
2005), online: Goldcorp Inc. <http://www.goldcorp.com/ resources/glamis/pressreleases/2005/
jan I3-05.pdf>.
61. Kelly Patterson, "Canadian Mine Strikes Lode of Unrest: The Debate over the Presence of a
Gold Mine in Guatemala has Resulted in a Call for 'Urgent Action' by Amnesty International"
Ottaiwa Citizen (26 April 2005).
62. Actas 04-2005 24 de enero, 06-2005 07 de febrero, 09-2005 28 de febrero, Corte de
Constitucionalidad, Guatemala, "Caso Sipacapa (Minerias)", Expediente 1179 - 2005, (8 May
2007) at 2, online: Constitutional Court of Guatemala <http://www.cc.gob.gt/index-2.html>
[Corte].
63. Ibid. at1. "[U]na "Consulta de Buena Fe con el objeto de que las autoridades indigenas, la
poblacion indigena de ascendencia maya sipakapense y vecinos mayores de 18 afhos del
municipio Sipacapa se pronunciaran a favor o en contra de Ia actividad minera de
reconocimiento, exploracion y explotaci6n de minerales metalicos a cielo abierto en dicho
municipalidad."
64. Ibid. at 21. "Los resultados de laConsulta de Buena Fe es una decision soberana de Ia voluntad
de la poblaci6n indigena y no indigena, mayores de 18 aftos vecindados en el Municipio de
Sipacapa, San Marcos; Ia cual sera de observancia general y obligatoria en el territorio del
municipio de Sipacapa." ["The outcome of the Consulta de Buena Fe is a sovereign decision of
the will of the Indigenous and non-Indigenous population over 18 years old residing in the
Municipality of Sipacapa, San Marcos; which decision will be in force in the territory of the
municipality of San Marcos."].
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la Cuesta, a municipality of Sipacapa, was in attendance. According to eyewitnesses, when Benigno left the church and headed towards his home, two
employees of the private security company hired by Glamis, the Golan
Group, shot five or six bullets, killing Alvaro Benigno. He was taken to the
National Hospital in Huehuetenango, where he was pronounced dead.65
According to Glamis, it was a private dispute, and a Glamis press release
reported that the company met with the family of Alvaro Sanchez, and
assisted them in filing charges with the police against the company security
guard.66
On June 8, 10 days before the consulta, Glamis issued a press release
which made the consulta sound sinister, secretive and intimidating.
Glamis has learned that a small group of private individuals in Sipacapa are
proposing to hold a referendum regarding whether or not the municipality
wants future mineral development within its borders .... The information
provided herein has been gathered from various sources believed to be reliable.
Glamis has received reports of intimidation by the referendum organizers,
including threats to shut off water or burn crops of residents if they vote against
the referendum. The Company understands that there will be no secret ballot,
but that in the face of such threats and intimidation, organizers
of the
67
referendum intend to conduct a public vote by a show of hands.
Glamis "communicated its concerns" to the non-government organizations
supporting the people of Sipacapa about the "apparently undemocratic and
abusive process," suggesting that they should reconsider their involvement.
Glamis labelled the referendum as "patently corrupt." This was strong
language and, in the context of Guatemala, threatening language.68
The community had arranged for the group of 70 national and
international observers to be present before, during and after the consulta. In
Latin America international observers have been used to provide some

65.

Mining Watch, "Killing of Alvaro Benigno Sanchez by Security Guards Working for Glamis
Gold Subsidiary in Guatemala" (5 April 2005), online: Mining Watch <http:/
www.miningwatch.ca/index.php?/Guatemala/Killingof Alvaro Be>. To date, no one has
been charged for either of these killings. In fact, according to Alvaro Sanchez, the father of the
deceased, and several NGOs that work in Guatemala, the manager of the Grupo Golan
company telephoned Benigno's family a number of times to offer them "settlement" money in
an attempt to ensure that the family would not begin a legal process against the company.
66. See Glamis Gold, Press Release, "Glamis Gold Comments on Recent Events in Guatemala"
(20 April 2005), online: Goldcorp Inc. <http://www.goldcorp.com/ resources/glamis/press
releases/2005/apr20-05.pdf>.
67. Glamis Gold, Press Release, "Glamis Gold Comments on Proposed Referendum in Guatemala"
(8 June 2005), online: Goldcorp Inc. <http://www.goldcorp.com/ resources/glamis/press
releases/2005/jun8-05.pdt>.
68. Ibid. Glamis claimed that the malority of people in the area supported the mine.
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protection to Indigenous people during conflicts over resources. The
presence of observers acts as a constraint on the exercise of power. It is
understandable then, that Glamis viewed their presence in a negative light,
referring darkly to "special interest groups."69
Ladan Mehranvar was one of the international observers."0 She
conducted interviews in the community to determine the source of the
information about intimidation of individuals by anti-mine activists, but was
unable to find any evidence other than the rumours reported by Glamis. The
local police stated that they had not received any denunciations of threats,
nor had they heard of any such incidents.
On June 13, five days before the vote, Glamis went to court to get an
injunction to stop the consulta from taking place. The provisional injunction
was granted.1 The municipality appealed the decision to the Constitutional
Court on June 17, but the mayor decided to withdraw his support for the
consulta. At around the same time, the Ministry of Energy and Mines
proceeded directly to the Constitutional Court, which did not issue an
injunction. The communities, nonetheless, continued with plans for the vote,
and announcements were made on the radio.
The day before the consulta, some children from the community
distributed unsigned pamphlets that claimed that the referendum was
cancelled. Similar announcements were sent out over local radio stations.
The pamphlets were later discovered to be from the offices of Montana
Exploradora, the subsidiary of Glamis.
The consulta took place notwithstanding these attempts to derail it. It
was realized simultaneously at three sites within the town of Sipacapa and in
10 rural communities in the region. Each community met at its local
community hall, where benches or individual chairs were placed in rows
facing the front stage. In the three communities visited by Ladan, the
auxiliary mayor and other local leaders spoke. Each community hall was
also connected to the local radio station which was airing the process live,
and ensuring a simultaneous vote. The question put out to the communities
was: "Are you in favour of mining on the territory of the Sipakapense
people?"
Each community carried out its voting according to the traditions and
customs of that particular community. Thus, in some communities there was
an open vote demonstrated by the show of hands. This was the case in San
69. Ibid. The groups included Guatemalan supporters such as the environmental group Madre
Selva and the Catholic church. There were also some international NGOs such as CARE and
Rights Action.
70. The description of the Consulta is taken from her own observations.
71. Lic. Guillermo Galindo Gonzalez, Juez Septimo de Primera Instancia Civil, Proceso
Constitucional de Amparo 87-2005 (13 June 2005).
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Isidro. The group that walked in included women with their babies and lots
of children. The participants were given an opportunity to talk, then five or
six community leaders, including the auxiliary mayor, counted the raised
hands (twice). In Sipacapa, the community, the vote was carried out by
secret ballots. In other communities, such as Quec i and Chual, people lined
up and individually marked their position (yes or no) on a poster-sized paper
(the "Act") that was managed by the auxiliary mayor of the community. In
some of the communities, individual members also signed the Act by either
a thumb-print or a signature.
The national and international observers were organized in smaller
groups to ensure a fair vote. Each group of observers was also given the task
of recording all events during the consulta within the community they were
based, including the completion of a questionnaire created by the organizers
of the referendum. The observers reported that there was a high level of
participation by both men and women and that there were no incidents of
violence or coercion.
In total, 2,426 persons voted against mining, 35 persons voting for
mining, 8 ballots were illegible, one was blank and 32 abstained. Of the 13
community assemblies, 11 rejected mining (the great majority unanimously),
one supported it and another community abstained from voting. In total, 98.5
per cent of the participating population rejected mining. The number of
people who participated in the referendum was 2,502. Of the total voting
population of Sipacapa, this represents 44.3 per cent. As a benchmark, in the
2004 federal elections, 3,087 people in Sipacapa (or 54.6 per cent of the
population) participated in the voting process.
On June 21, 2005, the Sipakapense population and each community
auxiliary mayor gathered in the central plaza of Sipacapa, San Marcos, to
present the results of the community consultations to the municipal
authorities. The Municipal Council issued a Municipal Agreement, which, in
its operative section, states: "Agrees: To abide by the outcome of the
Community Consultation carried out on June 18, 2005 by the community
authorities of the villages in the Municipality of Sipacapa, San Marcos."
Thus, the decision of the citizens to reject the exploration, exploitation, and
extraction of minerals in the territory of the Sipakapense people was
confirmed.72
All of these events occurred before a backdrop of impending and actual
violence.

72.

Mines and Communities, "The People of Sipacapa Reject Mining Activities in their Territory:
We Demand That Their Sovereign Decision be Respected", online: Mines and Communities:
<http://www.minesandcommunities.org/Action/press667.htm>.
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Bishop Alvaro Ramazzini, who led the march against the mine, had
received death threats and had to be put under government protection.73
There were death threats against other anti-mine activists and a car
belonging to one of the leaders was set on fire.74 After members of the
environmental group Madre Selva received threats and attacks, the InterAmerican Human Rights Commission ordered the government to provide
police protection.75 Glamis says that its workers were also threatened. What
is interesting is the approach to death threats by Kevin McArthur, then CEO
of Glamis. A June 23, 2005, press release from Glamis described an incident
in Sololi:
[T]hree residents of the municipality of Sololi (approximately 120 km from the
Marlin project) allegedly received death threats because of their opposition to
mining in general and the Marlin project in particular. These coincide with the
numerous death threats and threats of violence that have been directed toward
Marlin project employees and contract personnel in recent months.7 6

The press release suggests that, in the eyes of Glamis, the death threats to
anti-mining activists are only allegations whereas death threats to Glamis
employees are fact. McArthur condemned violence and stated that Glamis
had no knowledge of individuals issuing death threats. However, there is no
indication in any of the press releases from this time that Glamis
investigated the death threats against the anti-mining activists or had any
policy to deal with such threats.

V

EXERCISE OF INDIGENOUS LAW OR EXERCISE OF GUATEMALAN
LAW BY INDIGENOUS PEOPLE?

Prior to the 1990s the prevailing view in legal and political circles was that
only laws sanctioned by the state were valid. Laws of Indigenous peoples
themselves were not laws at all, but merely customs, traditions, habits, or
instincts. It was this approach which allowed a court in Australia in 1971 to
declare that, as a matter of law, Australia was terra nullius (empty land)
73. Patterson, supra note 61.
74. Ibid.
75. Amnesty International, "Guatemala: Further Information on Fear for Safety: Flaviano
Bianchini (m)" (23 February 2007), online: Amnesty International, Urgent Actions
<http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGAMR340092007?open&of--ENG-GTM>
["Fear
for Safety"].
76. Glamis Gold, Press Release, "Glamis Gold Comments on Sipacapa Referendum" (23 June
2005), online: Goldcorp Inc. <http://www.goldcorp.com/ resources/glamis/pressreleases/2005/
jun23-05.pdf>.
77. CAO Report (2005), supra note 45 at 36. "There is no system in place for addressing the
allegations and threats to security".
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when the first settlers arrived. In other words, the Aborigines did not exist
because they had no "law.""8 In 1990, Chief Justice McEachem made a
similar decision in Canada. He assumed that, because First Nations societies
did not have the same institutions, governmental structure, or technology,
they did not have law, social fabric or humanity.
It would not be accurate to assume that even pre-contact existence in the
territory was in the least bit idyllic. The plaintiffs ancestors had no written
language, no horses or wheeled vehicles, slavery and starvation were not
uncommon, wars with neighbouring peoples were common, and there is no
doubt, to quote Hobbes, 7that
[A]boriginal life in the territory was, at best,
9
"nasty. brutish and short.,

The judge concluded that "[the First ''a°
Nation people] more likely acted as
they did because of survival instincts.
There is no doubt that these approaches are no longer acceptable.
Indigenous laws have been accepted on their own terms in both domestic
and international spheres."1 What is at stake is not whether Indigenous law
exists, but how that law interacts with state law.
It is thus important to look at what happened in the consulta in Sipacapa
from this perspective. There are three features that should be noted.
First, the decision to hold the consulta was not a decision of "private
individuals," as alleged by Glamis, but rather a decision that was channeled
through existing governance structures in the community. The municipality
duly passed three resolutions relating to the process, which were
implemented through the village governance structures.
Second, there was a clear process. The process called for organized
community gatherings which were publicized in advance. On the day of the
consulta, the deliberations were well organized, orderly and provided a
means for community members to express their wishes. The fact that one
community abstained and another decided to vote in favour of the mine
indicates that the process contemplated a range of different results.
Third, the consulta, and the binding effect that it was meant to have,
were assertions of the will of the community. The community had the right
to hold the consulta and the community had the right to bind the government

78.
79.

80.
81.

Milirrpum v. Nabalco Pty Ltd. (1971), 17 F.L.R. 141.
The trial judgment by McEachem C.J.B.C. was delivered in Delgamuukw v. British Columbia,
[1991] 5 C.N.L.R. 1, 79 D.L.R. (4th) 185 (B.C.S.C.) atpara. 111. The Supreme Court of
Canada firmly rejected McEachem's comments, overturned the trial decision and sent the case
back for trial in 1997: [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010, 1 C.N.L.R. 14.
lbid.at para. 1343, McEachem C.J.B.C.
See generally, S. James Anaya, Indigenous Peoples in International Lanw, 2d ed. (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2004).
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of Guatemala and the mining company to the outcome of the consulta on its
territory. According to Indigenous law, the community could decide whether
there should be mining in their territory.82
From the Indigenous perspective, the authority and jurisdiction to act
does not arise from Guatemalan legislation. The authority arises from the
inherent rights that come with being an Indigenous people. The resolution of
the municipality referred to above speaks of the "sovereign decision of the
will of the [I]ndigenous and non-[I]ndigenous population"' The fact that a
judge attempted to issue an injunction was not valid within the Indigenous
law and that is why the consulta continued in spite of the court decision. The
community emphasized this point to a representative of the World Bank's
Compliance Advisor Office who went to Sipacapa in May 2006 to try to
start a dialogue between Sipacapa and Glamis:
In their view, the popular referendum that occurred June 18, 2005, has closed
the discussion about mining and their position is clear: "No to mining on our
territory." They also expressed the importance of retaining their land and not
selling it to the company. While some community members may want to
continue to debate the mining issue, most have no appetite for continuing to
discuss the dispute or engaging in dialogue over mining. "We can ignore the
mine as long as it doesn't affect us" captures the prevailing attitude.
Nevertheless, there is still little acceptance of the mine and no resolution of the
root causes of the dispute.84

The mine defied the results of the consulta. The company freely admitted
that it continued exploring land in Sipacapa, even though the municipal
leaders were opposed.85 According to Glamis, it was conducting exploration
activities only in communities where it received expressed support and
82.

CAO Report (2005), supra note 45 at 32:
[T]he self-guided nature of Montana's activities raises the issue of what questions
people are being asked during consultation: is it whether the project should go
ahead or rather how the project should go ahead. Without endorsing either
perspective, it appears that given the timing and extent of the proiect's consultation
activities it (i.e. the project) is asking to some extent how the project should go
ahead. The people of Sipacapa want to be asked whether or not the project should
be approved based on what the impacts will be on their territory from this mine and
from the future expansions.

83.
84.

85.

Corte, supra note 62 at 20: "una decision soberana de la voluntad de la poblaci6n indigena y
no indigena."
Compliance Advisor Ombudsmen ("CAO"), "CAO Follow-up Assessment, Guatemala" (May
2006), online: CAO <http://www.cao-ombudsman.org/html-english/documents/CAOGuate
malaMarlinReport-english-Mayl2006.pdf> at 6 ["CAO Follow up Report (2006)"].
Ibid. at 7. -[T]he mine is continuing to negotiate with individual landholders to explore for
mineral prospects Sipacapa ....
While we understand that no additional land has been
purchased, the mine is undertaking exploration activities with the permission of landowners
and villages but without the recognized approval of the municipality."
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consent.86 From the point of view of Indigenous law, this was a clear
violation. The community leaders had said that land in Sipacapa should not
be sold for the mine. Whether an individual person in Sipacapa has the right
to sell land should be determined by the community, not by the mine. If
there were a law in Canada prohibiting the sale of water, and an American
company tried to buy water directly from individual "willing sellers," the act
would be illegal irrespective of the wishes of the individuals.
This is not to say that there is a consensus that state law automatically
accedes when in conflict with Indigenous law. What is clear is that the
relationship between Indigenous law and state law is currently being worked
out in both the domestic and the international arena. During this stage, both
domestic and international law have put constraints on non-Indigenous
actors who violate Indigenous law. These constraints are what prevent the
unilateral overriding of Indigenous law. From the Indigenous law
perspective, however, it is important to realize that these are constraints put
on non-Indigenous actors by non-Indigenous actors. These constraints
should not be mistaken for Indigenous law itself.
In order to understand how these constraints operated in our case study,
it is important to have an appreciation of the power imbalances which are a
reality for the Indigenous people in Sipacapa and San Miguel Ixtahuacdin.

VI

POWER IMBALANCE

Goldcorp has assets of US $17.9 billion. 8 This is over half of Guatemala's
GDP of US $35.25 billion.88 Goldcorp "is the single largest taxpayer ever in
Guatemala"89 and claims that it will be contributing US $69.9 million in
taxes and royalties over 11 years to the Guatemalan government.9"
The enormous financial resources of the mine were publicly
acknowledged by the government of Guatemala. A Glamis press release
86.

Glamis Gold, "Response to CAO Follow-up Assessment Report" (22 May 2006), online: CAO
<http://www.cao-ombudsman.org/html-english/documents/GlamisResponsetotheCAOFollowUpAssessmentReport.pdf> at 2.
87. Goldcorp Inc., "Goldcorp 2006 Annual Report", online: <http://www.goldcorp.com/
resources/financials/annuals/2006 Goldcorp AR web.pdf> at I ["Goldcorp Annual Report
(2006)"].
88. "World Factbook: Guatemala" in International Market Research Reports, online: Industry
Canada <http://strategis.ic.gc.ca/epic/site/imr-ri.nsf/en/gr-05098e.html>.
89. Email from Jeff Wilhoit of Goldcorp to Dawn Paley (1 February 2007), online: Business &
Human Rights Resource Centre <http://www.business-humanrights.org/Search/SearchResults?
SearchableText-paley> ["Wilhoit Email"]. "President Berger has observed that Goldcorp is
the single largest taxpayer ever in Guatemala."
90. "Annex to CAO Report (2005)", supra note 47 at 16. US $3.9 million of a total $69.9 amount
is in royalties to government; San Miguel gets an additional $3.9 million in royalties, Sipacapa
was to get $778,000.
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from September 8, 2005, gives a glowing account of the announcement of a
highway in San Marcos with President of Guatemala Oscar Berger saying,
"San Miguel is going to win with new employment, economic activity as
well as infrastructure .... This is an exemplary project."91
In addition, the mine was involved in projects at the local level.
Glamis/Montana created its own "NGO" (non-governmental organization)
called Fundaci6n Sierra Madre which works with an American NGO called
Citizens Development Corps. According to their reports, the foundation has
trained midwives, provided vocational training in carpentry, sewing and
cooking, renovated health care centers and established 18 communal banks
for women.9 2 As of September 2005, Glamis had spent US $1.3 million and
committed another US $5 million over the next 10 years for community
improvements. Glamis funded school repairs and the hiring of teachers in
local community schools. Glamis also built a 24-hour medical clinic;
purchased and equipped an ambulance and helicopter rescue
service; and
3
installed chlorinators in both municipalities' water systems.
Involvement in these activities gave Glamis an attractive profile and in
February 2005, before the consulta, the World Bank referred to the company
as a "good corporate citizen."94 Since then, much has become unraveled.
The first clear analysis of the problems with Glamis' approach was
contained in a report commissioned by the World Bank itself. After a
complaint made to the Bank in March 2005, before the consulta was held,
the Bank sent the Office of the Compliance Advisor ("CAO" or
"Compliance Advisor") to investigate the complaints. The Compliance
Advisor reports directly to the president of the World Bank.95 In this case,
the Compliance Advisor prepared two reports, both written after the
consulta-the first in September 2005 and the second in May 2006. While
91.

Glamis Gold, Press Release, "Glamis Gold Comments on IFC Compliance Office Report on
Marlin Project" (8 September 2005).
92. "Annex to CAO Report (2005)", supra note 47 at 15.
93. Ibid.; "Marlin Fact Sheet", supra note 49 at 2. According to Ladan Mehranvar, some
community members questioned whether these projects had all taken place.
94. Letter from Rashad Kaldany, Director, Oil, Gas, Mining and Chemicals Department, IFC to
Shin Imai (22 February 2005).
95. The Compliance Advisor is one of the most important mechanisms for the World Bank to
ensure that the loan recipient is adhering to environmental and human rights standards. The
CAO can act as an ombudsman and can mediate disputes related to compliance (see Susan
Park, "Assessing the Accountability of the World Bank Group," online: <http://www2.war
wick.ac.uk/fac/soc/csgr/activitiesnews/workshops/forthcoming/wbbled/papers/park.pdf> at 26.
Another mechanism of accountability is the Inspection Council which reports to the executive
directors of the Bank and has an investigative and advisory role (see Clark, ibid. at 17). For an
account of the operation of a third mechanism, a compliance evaluation conducted by the
Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency, see David Szablowski, Transnational Law and
Local Struggles: Mining, Communities and the World Bank (Oxford and Portland: Hart, 2007).
The latter two mechanisms did not play a role in the Glamis situation.
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couched in neutral language, the reports provide a methodical record of the
failures of the state of Guatemala and Glamis. We will highlight two of the
issues here: the environment and consultation.
One of the environmental issues arises out of the use of the cyanide
leaching process.96 Due to the mountainous region, the dams that hold waste
water cannot be lined, and instead Glamis breaks down the cyanide content
in the water to appropriate levels before sending it to unlined dams. 97 The
possible contamination of groundwater from the use of cyanide is a pressing
environmental concern.98
The people of Sipacapa were particularly worried about competition for
water resources as well as possible contamination of the local water supply
from mining operations. The CAO report noted that Glamis' original
environmental assessment was incorrect in stating that there were no
individuals living downstream from the Tailing Storage Facility. It then went
on to find it unclear how the IFC determined that the Environmental and
Social Impact Assessment, which is required for IFC funding, was
adequate. 99
The Compliance Advisor, however, found that there was no significant
risk of water contamination to local communities near the mine, including
Sipacapa. 10° As well, it determined that due to an updated project design,
Sipacapa would not experience any water shortage from mine activities."'
Since the release of the Compliance Advisor report, various opinions
regarding the environmental impacts of the Marlin mine have been
submitted. A technical analysis from hydrogeologist Robert Moran retained
by environmental group Madre Selva claims that the hydrogeologist
consulted by the Compliance Advisor for its assessment had never visited
96.
97.

98.

99.
100.
101.

CAO Report (2005), supra note 45 at 15.
"Environmental Impact Assessment Summary", Online: IFC <http://ifclnOO.worldbank.org/
ifcext/spiwebsite .nsf/2bc34f011 b50ff6e85256a550073ffl c/60b8beb20d6bdc7285256e610054
690a?OpenDocument>.
"1-137: Ban on Cyanide Mining", online: Montana Environmental Information Center
("MEIC") <http://www.meic.org/mining/cyanide mining/ban-on-cyanide-mining/i-137>. An
indication of the controversial nature of cyanide is the fact that its use in mining has been
banned in the state
of Montana since 1998; Cambior Inc., Press Release, "Update Camp
Caiman Project" (11 October 2006), online: Cambior Inc. <http://www.cambior.com/2/
communiques/2006/06-10-11 EN CampCaiman Final.pdf>. A Cambior mine in Guyana is
stalled until the company's environmental plans can meet the requirements of the French
government. In particular, the government is concerned over the management and containment
of cyanide; see infra note 173 and accompanying text that discusses a big cyanide spill by
Cambior in Guyana that spurred a law suit in Canada; Fisheries Act: Metal Mining Effluent
Regulations, 6 June 2002, SOR/2002-222 (QL). Cyanide use in gold mining is not banned in
Canada, but its use is regulated if cyanide is used in the milling process (as a process reagent).
CAO Report (2005), supra note 45 at 20.
Ibid. ati.
Ibid. atii.
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the mine site and had based his opinion on documents provided by Glamis.
As well, Moran finds that the impact assessments in the Compliance Advisor
report were too simplistic and failed to take into account many factors and
long term scenarios. For example, in testing Acid Rock Drainage ("ARD"),
the Compliance Advisor hydrogeologist tested the ARD over 20 weeks.
However, Moran indicates that many in the industry use a longer period,
from 402 weeks to a year to properly predict the possible development of
0
ARD. 1
The second issue relates to the consultations that took place with the
people in the area. The ILO Convention 169 clearly requires states to consult
with Indigenous peoples "before undertaking or permitting any programmes
for the exploration or exploitation" of subsurface resources. 13 Yet in this
case there was no such consultation before the granting of a mining
concession. °4 Local individuals, who were hired to provide information after
the mining concession was granted, did not provide information on the
environmental impacts of the mining activities."' 5 The Environment and
Social Impact Assessment conducted by Glamis was wanting in that "issues
of acid rock drainage, dam safety and cyanide management were poorly
defined."'0 6 This Assessment itself was highly technical, and was presented,
not as a consultation, but as a fait accompli. The Compliance Advisor
suggests that this lack of information may have led to the signing of a
declaration of support for the mine by leaders in San Miguel and Sipacapa
early on in the project. The Compliance Advisor reports that this initial
support has dissipated and that "the complainants believe that Sipacapa was
102. Madre Selva & Robert Moran, "Response to CAO Assessment Report" (22 September 2005),
online: CAO <http://www.cao-ombudsman.org/html-english/documents/MadreSelvaResponse
CAOAssessmentReportEnglishwithtechnicalReviewAnnexEnglish 000.pdf)>.
103. ILO Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention (No. 169), (entered into force 5 September
1991), online: Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights <http://www.unhchr.ch/
html/menu3/b/62.htm> at Article 15.2 [ILO Convention 169].
104. "Annex to CAO Report (2005)", supra note 47 at 17: "No records relating to disclosure and
consultation are available for this period [1996-1998]. No evidence that municipalities of San
Miguel or Sipacapa or landholders were consulted or notified before/during granting of
exploration license was provided to the CAO."
105. CAO Report (2005), supra note 45 at 31: "The CRG personnel expressed that in general they
heard continuing concerns within both Sipacapa and San Miguel municipalities about the
environmental impacts of the project and noted that they were unable to explain project
impacts and mitigation plans, such as why water demands of the project would not impact local
users and how potential contamination of water supplies would be mitigated."
106. Ibid. "Public disclosures about project impacts and potential risks prepared by the companyincluding the ESIA were highly technical and did not at the time have sufficient information
to allow for an informed view on the likely adverse impacts of the project. In particular, issues
of acid rock drainage, dam safety and cyanide management were poorly defined."; Ibid. at ii.
"Much of the disclosure and consultation activity occurred after completion of the ESIA, and it
is reasonable to question the extent to which they had an opportunity to meaningfully
participate in the ESIA process."
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neglected in the consultation process and that the project has failed in its
obligations to involve them in the license approval process."'0 7 Finally, in its
report in May 2006, the Compliance Advisor sounds an alarm concerning
Glamis' explorations in Sipacapa, suggesting that "[t]he mine could declare
a temporary, voluntary suspension of exploration activities in Sipacapa"
because of the "the risks of continuing with exploration activities in
Sipacapa, particularly in the current climate of a tense calm."'0 8
Although there were many meetings, the Compliance Advisor stated
that the people of Sipacapa expressed dissatisfaction with the process and
observed that the "[flack of clarity about whether and how potential impacts
of the project were conveyed to local people, as opposed to a more general
discussions on project benefits."1"9
In the context of the types of concerns expressed by the Compliance
Advisor, one gets a hint that all of the activity on the part of Glamis did not
arise solely of benign good will. Glamis had faced significant opposition to
the mine and these "consultations" may have been more about selfpromotion than about fulfilling their legal duty outlined by the
Constitutional Court of Guatemala to "reach agreements or arrive at a
consensus."'" Viewed in this light, informational campaigns conducted by
Glamis which have reached "tens of thousands" of people could be seen as a
somewhat menacing use of economic and political power.,"
Perhaps this impression can be placed in better relief by taking the
perspective of the Indigenous population. Between 1962 and 1996, 15
massacres occurred within the San Marcos department.1 1 2 The mining
company showed up only three years after the Peace Accords had been
signed. It is apparent that the people of Sipacapa and San Miguel lxtahuacin
had little understanding of the potential impact of the mine in the early

107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

Ibid. at 28.
"CAO Follow up Report (2006)", supra note 84 at 12.
CAO Report (2005), supra note 45 at 31.
Corte, supranote 62 at 27.
"Wilhoit Email", supra note 89. "Proper, documented consultation has been carried out with
regard to the local communities, and informational campaigns continue to be a significant part
of our community relations effort. In the course of our frequently-held site visits and
community discussion forums, easily tens of thousands of people have been consulted and
asked for feedback, suggestions and recommendations."
112. Guatemalan Commission for Historical Clarification ("CEH"), "Number of Massacres by
Department", online: American Association for Advancement of Science, Science and Human
Rights Program, Map of Massacres <http://shr.aaas.org/guatemala/ceh/report/english/graphics/
charts/page83.gif>; Guatemalan Commission for Historical Clarification ("CEH"), "Total
Percentage of Human Rights Violations and Acts of Violence by Department, 1962-1996",
"Principle Violations by Year and by Department", online: American Association for
Advancement of Science, Science and Human Rights Program <http://shr.aaas.org/guatemala/
ceh/report/english/graphics/charts/page84.gif>.
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stages. When the mine started to become a reality, it became a reality in the
context of the tragic backdrop of the recent history of the area. The
overflights of reconnaissance planes and helicopters would have brought
back memories of the war, as would the use of the military to guard the mine
and the deployment of private security forces, apparently including exmilitary personnel. 13 These fears would be exacerbated by the killing of
Rail Castro Bocel, the protester in Solold, by the military, and the killing of
Alvaro Benigno by the security firm hired by Glamis. Surrounding these
events were death threats to Bishop Alvaro Ramazzini and others.
The Compliance Advisor was critical about the lack of attention paid by
Glamis to security issues:
The lack of a clear policy on human rights and the management of security
forces is a significant oversight on the part of both the company and IFC to
adequately safeguard against the potential for violence .... Local people remain
gravely concerned about security force issues, and the company
to date does
114
not have policies in place for management of security forces.

Glamis took some steps to address the issue, including adopting the U.S.U.K. Voluntary Principles on Security & Human Rights in its operations.'"
However, the intimidation and targeting of leaders was alleged to have
continued. A report from a member of a human rights NGO describes the
situation in July 2006:
On July 5th, Sipakapense community leader and former municipal mayor
Mario Tema was on his way to Huehuetenango with his wife when they were
followed by a green pickup truck with no license plates. Several community
members have informed Tema of conversations they have overheard in which
unknown individuals proclaim their intention to get rid of him in the same way
as his father, who was killed in 1987.
There are also concerted efforts to criminalize and delegitimize the community
leaders who have been at the forefront of the struggle in Sipacapa for
consultations and who have maintained a clear position against mining
activities in the municipality. There are at least three false accusations, mainly
of threats and possession of weapons, against community leaders Mario

113. CAO Report (2005), supra note 45 at 34. According to the report, the presence of the military
is required by Guatemalan law for safety with respect to explosives.
114. Ibid at 35.
115. World Bank/IFC, "Response to CAO Report (2005)" (14 October 2005), online: CAO

<http://www.cao-ombudsman.org/html-english/documents/Marlin-Responsetofinalreport.pdf>
at4.
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Perfecto Tema Bautista, Horacio Bamaca Mejia, Santos Arnulfo L6pez, Sergio
Carrillo Tojil. and Eliseo Bamaca.' 16

Nonetheless, opposition continues to grow. This is illustrated by events in
the municipality of San Miguel 1xtahuacdn where 85 per cent of the mine is
located. Most of the land was purchased in this municipality and in
September 2005, the Compliance Advisor reported that there were no
complaints from people selling the land. In January 2007, dozens of
protesters blocked entrances into the mines for a week complaining about
the land transactions.' 17 Then in March 2007, a group called the Communal
Front of Resistance to Mining Exploitation located in San Miguel
Ixtahuacdin released a declaration stating that they had been pressured and
intimidated into selling their lands. They complained of water wells drying
up and deaths to animals from tailings deposits.118 In May 2, 2007, another
organization from San Miguel Ixtahuacdn, the Asociaci6n para el Desarrollo
Integral San Miguelense, sent a letter to shareholders of Goldcorp, revealing
that two of their members had been taken away by the Guatemalan army in
the middle of the night and that there were arrest warrants out for 14 others.
They say, "all of this because these community members claim they were
cheated when people from your company came to take away their lands with
force and coercion."'' 9
The arrests may have been a response to pressure from Goldcorp for
direct action against those opposed to the mine. In February 2007, a
spokesperson for the mining company wrote that Goldcorp has asked "that
authorities investigate when fabricated social and environmental issues are
employed to further localized political contests in the country. "12

116. Sandra Cuffe, "San Miguel Ixtahuacan Announces Community Consultations & Sipacapa
Community Leaders Face Ongoing Repression" (20 July 2005), online: Global Exchange,
<http://www.globalexchange.org/countries/americas/guatemala/3354.html>.
117. "Guatemalan gold mine operations slowed by protests" Reuters News (17 January 2007).
118. "Press Release and Declaration by the Communities in Resistance in San Migual Ixtahuacan,
San Marcos, Guatemala to National and International Public Opinion" (7 March 2007), online:
<http://portal.rds.org.hn/ listas/medio-ambiente/msgO I 394.html>.
119. ADISMI, "Letter from Communities in Resistance to Goldcorp" (2 May 2007), online:
Fredericton Peace Coalition <http://frederictonpeace.org/?p-562>; "Wilhoit Email", supra
note 89. Goldcorp explains:
These road blocks were orchestrated by a small group expressing dissatisfaction
with land agreements they had entered into with Goldcorp. In short, they have
demanded more money after being paid well in excess of market value. Concerning
the blockades themselves, we are disappointed that instead of constructive dialogue,
those orchestrating this roadblock preferred to engage in harassment, threats and
intimidation to advance their claims.
120. "Wilhoit Email", supra note 89.
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From the Indigenous perspective then, they are facing a huge mining
company with seemingly unlimited resources to hire guards, access the legal
system, and draw on the support of the Guatemalan president. The company
has funds to invest in community sessions where it obtains information and
decides what to do with the information.
The Indigenous people of Sipacapa and San Miguel Ixtahuacdn, on the
other hand, have precious little. They are showered with information but do
not have a real say in the development of the mine. They cannot rely on the
military or the government. They have little in terms of financial resources,
political power, access to justice or even personal protection. One of the few
avenues open to them is to protest publicly and blockade roads.

VII

CONSTRAINTS WITHIN GU ATEMALA

For Glamis, the fact that there was a breach of Indigenous law was perhaps
of no concern. It believed that only Guatemalan law was valid and Goldcorp
now relies on the fact that it is in compliance with Guatemalan law.' 2
In the days before the consulta was held, the Ministry of Energy and
Mines brought a case to the Constitutional Court to stop the event from
taking place. The Constitutional Court released its decision in the Sipacapa
case on May 8, 2007, almost two years after the case was filed. The
arguments used by the Ministry of Energy and Mines turned on the illegality
of both the process of the consultation and the illegality of the attempt to
make the decision binding on the mine. They said that the Indigenous
community could only exercise authority granted under Guatemalan
legislation. The Ministry also argued that subsurface minerals belonged to
the state of Guatemala and a local municipality could not 2hold
a consultation
12
in relation to a matter that was not within its jurisdiction.
The Constitutional Court sent a strong rebuke to both the government
and the mine with respect to the consultation process. They found that the
consulta was legal and that it "constituted an important mechanism of
expression for the populace."'' 2 The decision pointed out that the municipal
resolutions setting up the consulta called for widespread notice of the event
and that there was no difficulty in obtaining certified copies of the resolution

121. "Wilhoit Email", ibid. "Two rulings by the courts at that time ruled the consultas to be
unconstitutional. Those rulings are still in place. Goldcorp's perspective is that we will abide
by the rule of law as defined by the courts and governmental bodies in Guatemala."
122. Corte, supranote 62 at 14, 15.
123. Ibid. at 26. "Este tribunal destaca que las consultas populares constituyen mecanismos
importantes de expresi6n popular."
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at the launch of the consulta process.124 The Court then urged the
government to make effective the requirement for consultation of Indigenous
peoples found under the ILO Convention 169 before mineral exploration by
legislating a consultation process for the future.125 Clearly, the Court did not
accept assurances that adequate consultation had taken place or that the
consulta organized in Sipacapa was unnecessary and "corrupt," as alleged by
Glamis.
The Court goes further in its criticism, stating that the objective of
consultation is not simply to discover community feelings, but to "reach
agreements or arrive at a consensus with respect to the proposed
measures."' 2 6 The Court pointedly states that mining activity should "provide
just compensation to the regions where the [mining] activities take place,
through economic and social measures for community development." 2 The
Court found, however, that the consulta was not binding within Guatemalan
law because authority for mining was placed with the Ministry of Energy
and Mines. 28

124. Ibid. at25:
[E]I Acta cero nueve-dos mil cinco (09-2005) establece que el Concejo Municipal y
el Concejo Municipal de Desarrollo Urbano y Rural publicaran, por todos los
medios a su alcance, el objeto del procedimiento consultivo por lo que no se aprecia
que los acuerdos restrinjan la posibilidad de conocer la convocatoria. Ademas, la
accionante expone, en el escrito inicial, que pudo obtener copias certificadas de las
actas referidas a ]a convocatoria.
125. ILO Convention 169, supra note 103, Article 15:
1. The rights of the peoples concerned to the natural resources pertaining to their
lands shall be specially safeguarded. These rights include the right of these peoples
to participate in the use, management and conservation of these resources. 2. In
cases in which the State retains the ownership of mineral or sub-surface resources
or rights to other resources pertaining to lands, governments shall establish or
maintain procedures through which they shall consult these peoples, with a view to
ascertaining whether and to what degree their interests would be prejudiced, before
undertaking or permitting any programmes for the exploration or exploitation of
such resources pertaining to their lands. The peoples concerned shall wherever
possible participate in the benefits of such activities, and shall receive fair
compensation for any damages which they may sustain as a result of such activities.
126. Corte, supranote 62 at 27: "no solo tienden a exteriorizar un sentimiento acerca de asuntos de
importancia comunal, sino tambien, con el objeto de lograr acuerdos o alcanzar consensos
acerca de las medidas propuestas."
127. Ibid.: "este Tribunal estima que el Organismo Ejecutivo en atencion al principio de que las
autorizaciones que se concedan para la actividad minera, debe generar mecanismos que
propicien compensacion justa a las regiones en donde se realiza dicha actividad, por medio de
medidas econ6micas y sociales de desarrollo comunitario."
128. Ibid. at 21: "[L]a Ley del Organismo Ejecutivo design6 al Ministerio de Energia y Minas, en su
articulo 34, literal c), como responsable de las politicas de exploracion, explotacion y
comercializaci6n de minerales."
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The courts in Guatemala have not been able to provide an effective
counterbalance to the exercise of state power, in part because the
Constitutional Court itself is beholden to the members of the legislature who
appoint them, and the party of the former dictator Rios Montt was successful
in manipulating the court appointments.129 In addition, the Court is not
immune to the threats from the still powerful military. In 1994 the President
of the Court, Epaminondas Gonzfilez Dub6n, was assassinated when a group
of men opened fire on his vehicle in Guatemala City. He had just ordered the
extradition to the United States of a military official accused of drug
trafficking. '°
In the Sipacapa case, the Constitutional Court made some fairly pointed
remarks with respect to the conduct of Glamis and the government of
Guatemala. Yet the Court did not go the extra step to actually stop the
exploration. It was certainly open to the Constitutional Court to take the
approach of the Supreme Court of Canada and require that consultation
take
131
place before further action is taken by the resource company.
The Guatemalan state is still living with the power of the military and its
dictators. There are strong democratic forces in Guatemala and individuals
in government, the military and the churches who wish to move forward.
However, the former dictators did not have to flee the country or face any
legal accounting. In fact, they continue to run for office. Rios Montt, the
dictator during the worst period of violence in Guatemala in the early 1980s,
was the elected President of Guatemala's Congress in 2000.132 After a ruling
by the Constitutional Court, Montt was even able to run in the 2003
Guatemalan presidential election.' 3
In 2003, the colonel who ordered the death of the forensic anthropologist Myrna Mack in 1990 was freed by a lower court, only a year after
he was sentenced. Despite a new Supreme Court ruling that reinstated his
conviction due to public and international pressure, the colonel has eluded
custody. "'
Death threats and killings of human rights activists in Guatemala are all
too common-even in 2007. Cases for Urgent Action are announced on the
Amnesty International website at least twice every month for Guatemala.
129. Sieder, "Guatemala Judiciary", supranote 4 at 224.
130. Lethal Legacy, supra note 39 at 40-43.
131. In Canada, there is a growing body of law defining the parameters of consultation. The leading
case is Haida Nation v. British Columbia,2004 SCC 73, 245 D.L.R. (4th) 33.
132. Susanne Jonas, "Democratization through Peace: The Difficult Case of Guatemala" (2000)
42:4 J. Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, Special Issue: Globalization and
Democratization in Guatemala at 31.
133. "The Americas: General riot: Guatemala's Election Row" The Economist 368:8335 (2 August
2003) 53.
134. "International Court Condemns Guatemala over Murder" Reuters News (19 December 2003).
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One of the Urgent Actions concerns the people who are carrying on the work
of the murdered anthropologist, Myrna Mack, in attempting to identify
victims of massacres.' 5 Nobel Prize winning Indigenous activist Rigoberta
Menchu is also surrounded by death. She is running for president in the 2007
elections heading a party called Encuentro por Guatemala. In August 2007
shots were fired at the home of candidate Olga Marina Lucas L6pez, and her
two daughters (aged 15 and 20) were hospitalized with gunshot wounds. A
few days before, an attempt was made on the life of executive member Cdsar
Montes. These attempts followed a string of previous murders. In April
2006, Esteban Tebalin, a party coordinator was assassinated. In October of
that year, Eduardo Maaz, the uncle of a regional party official, was shot to
death. In May 2007, Liverato Granados, a mayoral candidate, was shot to
death.136
There are clearly problems within the state in extending protection to
those who are pursuing human rights for Indigenous people. The state is also
vulnerable to economic forces. It has few sources of income and its natural
resources are an important source of revenue. Consequently, there is an
enormous incentive to address poverty through natural resource exploitation.
There is little economic incentive to impose barriers to mining and the
Constitutional Court found that the state had no mechanisms for complying
with the consultation requirements of ILO Convention 169.137
Related to the economic vulnerability of the state is the lack of capacity
in the government to monitor the mines. The Compliance Advisor found, for
example, that the government of Guatemala had no capacity to monitor the
environmental obligations and other obligations undertaken by Glamis with
respect to the operation of the mine. '
It can be seen that the state does not provide an effective counterbalance
to a large corporation, partly because the democratic state itself is struggling
to protect human rights, and partly because the country is vulnerable to
economic necessity.

135. Amnesty International, "Guatemala", online: Amnesty International, Urgent Actions
<http://web.amnesty.org/library/eng-gtm/index>.
136. Julio Lara, Lorena Seijo, Jessica Osorio, "Se solidarizan con EG: Dos dirigentes de partido han
sido atacados en menos de 48 horas" (9 August 2007), online: Prensa Libre <http:/www
.prensalibre.com/pl/2007/agosto/09/179303.html>.
137. Corte, supranote 62 at 27.
138. CAO Report (2005), supra note 45 at iii: "CAO found no record of analysis of company
capacity nor of government capacity to supervise or regulate the prqiect."
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INTERNATIONAL CONSTRAINTS ON NON-INDIGENOUiS ACTORS

There are a variety of possible avenues for attempting to put pressure on
states to respect Indigenous rights including the enforcement mechanisms
under the United Nations conventions and applications to the Interamerican
Commission on Human Rights. 139 Here, we will focus on the instruments
that are most relevant in the Sipacapa case: the International Labor
Organization's Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention (No. 169) and the
guidelines of the World Bank.
ILO Convention 169 requires governments to consult with Indigenous
peoples when legislative decisions affect these communities directly. 0
Under ILO Convention 169, states must ensure that Indigenous peoples are
free to participate in decision-making bodies through their appropriate
representatives and that consultation efforts are conducted in good faith.14
The goal of consultations is to either reach an agreement or to gain consent
from the Indigenous community for the proposed action. 42 With respect to
mining of minerals, states are required to consult with communities prior to
exploration or exploitive activities. 4 3 As well, states must share the benefits
of such mining activities with the Indigenous community. 44
There are differing views on how the Convention should be
implemented. A UN International workshop on the concept of free, prior
informed consent discussed this issue in 2005. Consultation, according to the
report of the workshop, involves a timely meeting with Indigenous peoples
which allows them to influence the project or the decision to proceed with a
proposal.145 It requires the state to meet with those who represent the
Indigenous community and must be more than an information session
regarding the proposed action.'46 The report identified two fundamental
139. For a general discussion see Anaya, supra note 81 and Szablowski, supra note 95. Among the
international standards that could be potentially applicable are the United Nations Global
Compact (2000), online: <http://www.unglobalcompact.org/>; Norms on the Responsibilities
of TransnationalCorporationsand Other Business Enterprisesw1ith Regard to Human Rights,
UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2 (2003), online: <http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/links/
norms-Aug2003.html>; The OECD Guidelinesfor Multinational Enterprises (2000), online:

<http://www.oecd.org/ dataoecd/56/36/1922428.pdf> and the CERES Principles (1993),
online: <http://www.ceres.org/coalitionandcompanies/principles.php>
140. ILO Convention 169, supra note 102 at Article 6.

141. Ibid.
142. Ibid.
143. Ibid. at Art. 15.

144. Ibid.
145. International Workshop on Free, Prior and Informed Consent and Indigenous Peoples,
"Contribution of the ILO" (New York, 17-19 January 2005), online: United Nations
<http://www.un.org/esa!socdev/unpfii/documents/workshop

Consent Workshop (2005)"].
146. Ibid.; Anaya, supra note 81 at154.

FPIC ILO.doc> at 2 ["UN Prior
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principles of the ILO Convention 169. First, it promotes the right of
Indigenous peoples to determine their own priorities relating to their future
community.'47 Second, it states that Indigenous peoples must be able to
make changes to proposed plans through participation in the decisionmaking process.148 These principles place a burden on the state to justify its
decisions on issues that affect, or are in conflict with, the wishes of
Indigenous peoples.'49 Despite these principles, the report falls short of
saying that the complete consent of an Indigenous community is a necessary
requirement of the Convention.15
A review of Guatemala's compliance with ILO Convention 169 in the
context of the Glamis mine was conducted by the ILO Committee of Experts
on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations in its 77th Session
(2006). The Committee noted that Guatemala had said it was in the process
of developing legislation and machinery to provide for consultation.
However, the Committee expressed reservations about the continued
exploration and exploitation by the mining company, asking whether "it will
be possible to carry out the studies provided for in Article 7 of the
Convention in cooperation with the peoples concerned before the potentially
harmful effects of these activities become irreversible." The Committee also
asked for an investigation into the killing during the road blockade at
Solol . 1
The ILO has no ability to directly enforce its findings, relying instead on
the good will of governments to follow recommendations of the Committee
of Experts. The problem is one that is common in other international
instruments. In the case of Guatemala, it has ratified the Convention and
incorporated it into domestic law, but it has not implemented the
consultation requirements in domestic legislation. In the Sipacapa case, the
Constitutional Court exhorted the state to provide legislation,
but did not go
15 2
so far as to apply the provisions of the Convention directly.
The operational policies of the World Bank offer another possible
constraint. It has the advantage of applying directly to the borrowing
corporation. The World Bank guidelines are similar to the principles of ILO
Convention 169. They require borrowers to conduct "free, prior, and
informed consultation" with the Indigenous community that will be affected

147.
148.
149.
150.
151.

"UN Prior Consent Workshop (2005)", supra note 145 at 3.
Ibid.
Anaya, supra note 81 at 155.
"UN Prior Consent Workshop (2005)", supra note 145 at 3.
ILO Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations, 77th
Sess. (2006) at para. 7, online: ILO <http://webfusion.ilo.org/public/db/standards/normes/appl/
appl-displayAllComments.cfm?hdroff-1&ctry-0270&conv-C 169&Lang-EN>.
152. Corte, supra note 62 at 27.
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by their activities153 and stipulate that these consultations result in "broad
community support" before they will provide funding for a proposed
project."' The consultations themselves should be culturally appropriate and
respect the institutions and customs of the community.155
The World Bank must rely on using their loans as leverage for
compliance. The Compliance Advisor, discussed above in relation to the
disputes at Sipacapa, was one mechanism used to determine whether Glamis
was complying with the conditions of the loan. In November 2006, Goldcorp
Inc. completed its acquisition of Glamis, and is the new owner and operator
of the Marlin Mine. Almost immediately Goldcorp paid off its US $45
million dollar loan from the World Bank, thereby
relieving itself of any
156
obligation to comply with World Bank guidelines.

IX

WHAT IS THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE GOVERNMENT OF
CANADA?

The Canadian embassy in Guatemala has been very active in promoting
Canadian mining in Guatemala. On November 4, 2004, just two days before
a community meeting in San Marcos about the mine, the Ambassador for
Canada, James Lambert, wrote an opinion piece in a Guatemalan newspaper
praising the Canadian mining industry for being "in the vanguard of
advanced technology, protection of the environment and social
responsibility."' 57 He gushed about similarities between Guatemala and
Canada, and said that 1,200 Indigenous communities in Canada benefit from
mineral exploration.15 8 This was part of a campaign by the embassy to "shore
up public support" and included arranging for a local Guatemalan
community leader and journalist to fly to British Columbia for five days to
153. World Bank, OperationalPolicy on Indigenous Peoples 4. 10 (July 2005), online: World Bank
<http://wblnOOI8.worldbank.org/Institutional/Manuals/OpManual.nsf/B52929624EB2A35382

5672E00775F66/0F7D6F3F04DD70398525672C007D08ED?OpenDocument> at paras. 1, 6.
154. Ibid.
155. Ibid. at paras.1, 6, 10.

156. "Goldcorp Annual Report (2006)", supra note 87 at 68. The loan was repaid 29 December
2006.
157. James Lambert, "Colaboracion Mineria en Canada" (4 November 2004), online: Prensa Libre
<http://www.prensalibre.com/pl/2004/noviembre/04/100834.html>. "Hoy en dia, las empresas
canadienses estdn a ]a vanguardia en alta tecnologia, proteccion del medio ambiente y
responsabilidad social. Es por eso que en ]a actualidad son ellas las que estdn al frente de
muchas de las operaciones mineras mas exitosas del mundo."
158. It would be interesting to see where the ambassador got this number, since there are not that
many Indian reserves in Canada. Even counting Inuit communities one would be hard pressed
to reach that number. And certainly only a small percentage of the total number of
communities are benefiting from natural resource exploitation. Many are, in fact opposing
natural resource exploitation and some have set up blockades.
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look at mining in a Canadian Indigenous community.159 The embassy also
arranged for First Nation chief Phillip Asp to attend a forum on mining in
Guatemala City. It is ironic that Mr. Asp's pro-mining stance was not
supported by Elders of his own band, some of whom occupied the band
office in protest.16
In El Estor, the old INCO site associated with the Exmibal killings from
the 1970s, another Canadian mining company, Skye Resources has taken
over. In January of 2007, the company had the army evict hundreds of
Indigenous people off disputed land. Rather than taking a neutral stand on
the dispute, the Canadian ambassador lashed out at Canadians on the site
who filmed the evictions, charging that the Canadians had used an actor and
unrelated photos to fabricate a story. It is alleged that the ambassador even
spoke to the Catholic church in the region to discredit the Canadian
journalists. The story ran on the CBC radio show "As It Happens" with an
interview with the video maker, Steven Schnoor, who said that he has
offered to provide the negatives of the photos. Neither the ambassador,
Kenneth Cook, nor the Department of Foreign Affairs would agree to be
interviewed. Perhaps most damning to Cook was the fact that the president
of Skye Resources, Ian Austin, did agree to be interviewed a week later by
the CBC. In that interview he claimed no knowledge of the ambassador's
accusations and would only say that it was up to the ambassador to clarify
his remarks. Certainly, the strange silence from the ambassador has not
helped the credibility of Skye Resources which is tarnished by association
with what appears to be a fabricated accusation. 6 '
We question whether this type of advocacy on behalf of the mining
industry by the Canadian embassy is appropriate. Given the enormous power
imbalances and the lack of checks and balances within Guatemala, should
Canada be weighing in so heavily on one side? In June 2005, the 3 8 th
Parliament's Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International
Trade ("SCFAIT" or "Standing Committee") issued its report, Mining in
Developing Countries and CorporateSocial Responsibility, which called on
the Government of Canada to play a more responsible monitoring role in
ensuring that resource companies adhere to internationally recognized
human rights standards, particularly in relation to Indigenous peoples.
The Standing Committee heard submissions on a number of hearings
into Canadian resource extraction activities in Colombia, Sudan, the
159. Celeste Mackenzie, "Canadian mine in eye of storm" Toronto Star (27 March 2005) A14.
160. Monte Paulsen, "Tahltan Resistence to Mining, Drilling Grows" (7 March 2005), online: The
Tyee <http://thetyee.ca/News/2005/03/07/TahltanResistanceGrows/>. At the time the story
was written, Elders had occupied the band office for eight weeks.
161. The video and the CBC interviews are available, online: <http://www.rightsaction.org/video/
elestor>.
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Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Philippines. The Standing
Committee noted that Canadian companies were involved in countries
"where regulations governing the mining sector and its impact on the
economic and social wellbeing of employees and local residents, as well as
on the environment, are weak or non-existent, or where they are not
enforced." They expressed concern that "Canada does not yet have laws to
ensure that the activities of Canadian mining companies in developing
countries conform to human rights standards, including the rights of workers
and of [l]ndigenous peoples." The committee recommended that there be
"clear legal norms in Canada to ensure that Canadian companies and
residents are held accountable when there is evidence of environmental
and/or human rights violations associated with the activities of Canadian
'
mining companies." 162
The government's response was not to draft legislation for such legal
norms, but rather to establish a process called the National Roundtables on
Corporate Social Responsibility ("CSR") and the Canadian Extractive
Industry in Developing Countries.' 63 An Advisory Group representing civil
society, investors, and mining and exploration executives met between June
and November 2006, in Vancouver, Calgary, Toronto and Montreal. On the
basis of the SCFAIT Report, five themes were selected to guide the
Roundtables process: CSR standards and best practices; incentives for
implementation; assistance to companies; CSR monitoring and dispute
resolution mechanisms; and resource governance capacity building. The
Report of the Advisory Group was released on March 29, 2007. It made
recommendations on strengthening the monitoring of Canadian resource
companies overseas.64 It recommended that an independent ombudsman
office be created to provide advisory, fact finding and reporting services
regarding complaints with respect to the operations of Canadian extractive
companies in developing countries. The Report also urges the government to
create a Compliance Review Committee, which will be independent of the
government and the parties. The role of the Compliance Review Committee
is to ensure compliance with a set of Canadian Corporate Social
Responsibility standards, based upon findings of the ombudsman with
respect to complaints, and to make recommendations regarding appropriate
162. Canada "Government Response to the Fourteenth Report of the Standing Committee on
Foreign Affairs and International Trade: Mining in developing countries-Corporate Social
Responsibility", online: <http://cmte.parl.gc.ca/Content/HOC/committee/381/faae/govresponse/
rp2030362/faaerptl4_gvtrsp-e.htm>["SCFAIT CSR Report"].
163. Ibid.
164. National Roundtables on Corporate Social Responsibility ("CSR") and the Canadian Extractive
Industry in Developing Countries, "Advisory Group Report" (29 March 2007), online: Foreign
Affairs and International Trade Canada <http://geo.international.gc.ca/cip-pic/library/Advisory
%20Group%/o2OReportlo200o2OMarch %202007.pdf> ["CSR Roundtable"].
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responses in such cases.165 The Report suggests that the federal government
be more aggressive in using financial incentives such as the investments
made by the Export Development Corporation and the Canada Pension
Plan.166 In the case of Goldcorp, this would put into play the Canada Pension
Plan's CAN $181 million investment in Goldcorp. 16
The Report envisions a role for Canada that is responsive to concerns
about human rights abuses, especially in relation to Indigenous people. For
example, the Report states:
Determination by the Government of Canada of a serious failure by a company
to meet the Canadian CSR Standards should lead to the withdrawal of this
additional support. The Government of Canada should develop policies and
guidelines for measuring serious failure. Among other things, in deciding

whether there has been such a serious failure, the government shall take into
account a finding by the Compliance Review Committee that the company is
not in compliance with the
Canadian CSR Standards and any accompanying
1 68
relevant recommendations.

In order to fulfil this monitoring role, the government would have to rely on
assessments from Canadian embassies. This would imply that embassies and
ambassadors should take a more neutral role in assessing the conduct of
Canadian resource companies overseas than has been the case to date.
There was no consensus in the Advisory Committee on the necessity for
the legislation recommended by the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs
and International Trade. While Canadian NGOs argued for the
implementation of legislation, the industry representatives were not in
favour of any legislation that was similar to the American Alien Tort Claims
Act. The Alien Tort Claims Act allows American companies to be sued by
foreigners from the host country in American courts for torts committed
abroad. 69 It is under this legislation that Talisman Energy is currently being
sued in the United States for its alleged complicity in the massacres in the

165. Ibid.

166. Ibid. atxi-xiii, 39. Failure of companies to meet Canadian CSR standards should lead to
withdrawal of EDC funding. As well CPP should monitor and report on implementation of its
Policy on Responsible Investing.
167. CPP Investment Board, "Canadian Equity Holdings: As of March 31, 2007", Online:
<http://www.cppib.ca!files/PDF/CDN Equity Holdings March31 2007 - ENG.pdf>.
168. "CSR Roundtable", supra note 164 at xiii, 48.
169. Craig Scott & Robert Wai, "Transnational Governance of Corporate Conduct through the
Migration of Human Rights Norms: The Potential Contribution of Transnational 'Private'
Litigation" in C. Joerges, P. Sand & G. Teubner, eds., Transnational Governance and
Constitutionalism(Oxford: Hart, 2004) 287 at 294, 315; Madelaine Drohan, Making a Killing:
How and Why Corporations Use Armed Force to Do Business (Toronto: Random House
Canada, 2003) at327.
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Sudan.1"0 A representative of Talisman Energy was a member of the
Advisory Committee.
At the present time, the Report of the Advisory Committee merely
provides recommendations for the future. It does not provide any immediate
means for monitoring or providing checks and balances to the economic and
political power wielded by Canadian resource companies today in countries
like Guatemala.
Notably, however, the Report does discuss the possibility of using
Canadian courts to provide some oversight through criminal prosecution and
civil tort claims. For example, with respect to criminal prosecution, the
Advisory Committee felt that Canada had a "reasonably long arm."'' With
respect to civil litigation, the federal government had earlier stated in its
response to the Report of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and
International Trade:
Legal remedies to address environmental or human rights violations can also
arise from civil rather than criminal law. To the extent that crimes or wrongs,
such as damage to the environment or personal injuries, committed outside
Canada also constitute claims of the sort cognizable as a tort, civil law remedies
may be available to the foreign plaintiff in Canadian courts. As such, Canadian
corporations or their directors and employees may be pursued in Canada for
their wrongdoing in foreign countries. 172
Some of these avenues have been explored by academics 7, in Canada but
there has been only one actual court case. In 1998, a class action was
brought in a Quebec court against Cambior after a faulty dam resulted in
cyanide contamination of a river in Guyana.174 Although the court stated
both Guyana and Quebec had jurisdiction to hear the matter, it found that
Guyana was the appropriate forum. This decision is primarily based on the
strong connection of the accident and victims to Guyana, and the victims'
lack of association with Quebec. The court also stated that its decision not to
hear the case did not deny the victims justice, since the Guyana court system

170. For information on the law suit, see Business and Human Rights Resource Centre, online:
<http://www.business-humanrights.org/Categories/Lawlawsuits/Lawsuitsregulatoryaction/Law
suitsSelectedcases/TalismanlawsuitreSudan>. See also Drohan, ibid. at 321, 323, 327, who
argues that national governments need to take action when a company based in their country is
responsible for misconduct abroad.
171. "CSR Roundtable", supra note 164 at 45.
172. "SCFAIT CSR Report", supra note 162.
173. See, for example, Scott & Wai, supra note 169 and Lisa North, Timothy David Clark &
Viviana Patroni, eds., Community Rights and CorporateResponsibility: Canadian Mining and
Oil Companies in Latin America (Toronto: Between the Lines, 2006).
174. Recherches InternationalesQudbec v. Cambior Inc. (1998), [1998] Q.J. No. 2554 at para. 4
[Cambior].
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would provide them with a "fair and impartial hearing."1 5 However, the real
reasoning behind the decision may be the unwillingness to make a negative
statement about judges and the legal system in another jurisdiction.'76 The
victims did pursue their claim in the Guyana courts, but due to procedural
issues, it was dismissed in 2002.17
Courts may be concerned about using Canadian law to try to affect
conduct of corporations outside of Canada. The Supreme Court of Canada in
Shell Canada Products v. Vancouver (City oJ) found that the City of
Vancouver did not have jurisdiction to pass a resolution against doing
business with Shell Oil. At that time, the city was objecting to Shell's
business ties with the apartheid regime in South Africa.'78
Courts may also be reluctant to take jurisdiction given that there should
be more appropriate mechanisms for ensuring accountability, including the
recommendations made by the Advisory Committee. The problem, however,
cannot wait until a future enforcement system is in place. The reality is that
in Guatemala today, there is a deficit in the mechanism for accountability-a
deficit in the checks and balances needed to address the interests of
Indigenous people in Sipacapa and San Miguel Ixtahuacdin.
We have seen that the state of Guatemala does not have the legislative
mechanisms for consultation nor the technical capacity to monitor the
project. It does, however, benefit from the revenues generated by the mine.
The World Bank was aware of the shortcomings of the state of
Guatemala and the importance of community projects. It provided a US
$780 million aid package to Guatemala, announced in a Glamis press
release. 79 There was a further proposal for the World Bank to provide
funding to the government to ensure that it has the capacity to monitor the
project.18 0 The World Bank also provided funding to Glamis' Sierra Madre
Foundation for community improvement projects.' 8 ' It is important to

175.
176.
177.
178.

Ibid. at paras. 9-12.
Scott & Wai, supra note 169 at 301.
Ibid. at 302.
Shell CanadaProducts v. Vancouver (City oJ), [1994] 1 S.C.R. 231. The majority of the Court
held that the city did not have jurisdiction to make decisions based on matters on the conduct
of a corporation overseas. However, it was a very close 5:4 decision and the current Chief
Justice, McLachlin J. dissented.
179. Glamis Gold, Press Release, "Glamis Gold Comments on World Bank Financial Assistance
Program in Guatemala" (19 May 2005).
180. CAO Report (2005), supra note 45 at 39. "Given the high risk nature of the Marlin investment,
the IFC should consider leveraging support from the WBG to improve the capacity of
Guatemalan government agencies to effectively regulate the Marlin project and other projects
in the mining sector."
181. "Annex to CAO Report (2005)", supra note 47 at 14. The Sierra Madre Foundation annual
operating budget is US $400K+, of which IFC has contributed $89K.
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remember, however, that the World Bank also had an interest in the mine
being able to pay back its loan.
The appointment of the Compliance Advisor for the World Bank
provided an opportunity for a third party to review the commitments made
by Glamis to the IFC for the loan. However, the Compliance Advisor was
not truly "independent," as the office is funded by and reports to the
president of the World Bank.
The Canadian embassy could theoretically take a more neutral stance
than it has, but this would require the embassy to rethink its mandate to
vigorously support Canadian mines and their shareholders when there are
disputes between the mine and Indigenous peoples." 2
While the lack of an effective counterbalance is problematic, the
intertwining of economic, political and military interests emphasizes a
serious deficiency in checks and balances in this situation. We have
discussed the accountability structures which may exist-the state of
Guatemala, the World Bank, the Compliance Advisor, the embassy of
Canada. All of these non-Indigenous actors have an interest in the mine
being profitable. There are many politicians, officials and even members of
the military in Guatemala who are struggling to deal with the past and move
forward with integrity, recognizing the rights of Indigenous peoples. Given
the fragility of internal mechanisms of accountability, their struggle would
be enhanced with the availability of an effective external monitoring
institution. In the admittedly un-ideal present, a Canadian court that could
provide a forum to fairly hear evidence and provide appropriate sanctions
may be the best for which we can hope.

X

CONCLUSION

We began with the story of the Canadian mining company, INCO in the El
Estor region of Guatemala. We described the years of brutal dictatorships
during the 1970s and 1980s. While democracy has returned, in name, and
Peace Accords have been signed, we have pointed out the tenuous ability of
the state to ensure respect for human rights. We brought the story to the
present by returning to El Estor and the evictions of hundreds of Indigenous
people from disputed lands by Skye Resources in 2007.
We realize that we have focused on criticisms of the activities of
Goldcorp, but the intent of this article is not raise the larger question of
whether mining is "good" or "bad." Rather, the central theme in this article

182. Mackenzie, supra note 159, quoting Ginette Martin, Political Affairs Officer for the Canadian
embassy.
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is the exercise of Indigenous law and the deficit in the checks and balances
for powerful economic actors who may be breaching Indigenous law.
We have shown that the people of Sipacapa intended the consulta to be
binding. The Compliance Advisor noted that the community felt
"intimidated" by the wave of exploration activities and made observations
on the dangers of Glamis' activities.
Without the possibility of broader formal dispute mediation process, the
company relies upon a practice of engaging in bilateral relations, negotiating
with individual villages rather than the municipality as a whole. The risk of this
approach is that it may be contrary to what some members of the municipality
say they have collectively decided. Such practice emphasizes narrow group
identities and divisions among groups rather than broader, common identities
and connections. It can also undermine rather than enhance social cohesion and
contribute to conflict escalation. In addition,
sometimes problems cannot be
18 3
solved using bilateral or unilateral strategies.

In spite of these significant concerns, the Compliance Advisor could not
order compliance; it could only advise. In any case, Goldcorp, by paying off
the World Bank loan, has put itself beyond the reach of the Compliance
Advisor.
Goldcorp has several operational mines and development projects in
Latin America including Mexico, Argentina, Chile, Dominican Republic and
Honduras."8 4 Protests regarding these projects have occurred in local
communities near these mining operations. Just as in Guatemala, local
communities in Honduras have protested that they were not consulted
regarding the development of the mine.18 As well, these communities claim
that their water is polluted with lead and arsenic from the mine.' 6 In Canada,
Goldcorp illegally discharged 11,000 cubic metres of tailings into Red Lake,
Ontario, and was required to pay a fine of $225,999.187 The Globe and Mail
awarded Goldcorp a D+ for corporate social responsibility.8 8

183. "CAO Follow up Report (2006)", supra note 84 at 12.
184. 'Goldcorp Gold Properties", online: Goldcorp <http://www.goldcorp.com/goldjrojects/>.
185. Anna Cody, "Presentation to the Committee on Economic, Social & Cultural Rights: Gold
Mining in Honduras", online: Center for Economic and Social Rights <http://cesr.org/node/
62?PHPSESSID-97fa44e2dc20667a749c2fa25b763b99>.
186. Stephen Leahy, "Protests Mount Against Mining Giant" (24 February 2007), online: Mines &
Communities <http://www.minesandcommunities.org/Action/press 1381 .htm>.
187. Ontario Ministry of the Environment, News Release, "Goldcorp Inc. Fined $225,999 for NonCompliance with Ontario Water Resources Act" (1 November 2005), online:
<http://www.ene.gov.on.ca/ envision/news/2005/l 10101 .htm>.
188. "CSR Mining" Globe and Mail Update (22 February 2007), online: The Globe and Mail
<http://www.theglobeandmail.com/servIet/story/RTGAM.20070222.rmcsrmining/BNStory/spe
cialROBmagazine/>.
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In Guatemala, Goldcorp continues to attempt to make inroads into
Sipacapa and is not committed to respecting the results of the consulta.'89
There is now mounting opposition to the mine in the neighbouring
municipality of San Miguel Ixtahuacdn culminating in blockades and arrests.
In January 2007, an Italian environmental activist, Flaviano Bianchini,
released a report suggesting that the mine had caused problems with the
water in San Marcos. Goldcorp responded by saying that the study was
"deeply flawed if not patently false" and "quite possibly fraudulent."' 9 °
During his time in Guatemala, Mr. Bianchini received a string of anonymous
threatening calls on his phone and was the subject of surveillance. Amnesty
International issued an Urgent Action on his behalf. Fearing for his safety,
he cut short his stay and returned to Italy.191
This is the type of situation which begs for an effective, independent
institution that can require accountability. There needs to be a body that can
weigh the interests and actions of Goldcorp against the interests and rights of
the Indigenous peoples in the area. The Advisory Committee of the National
Roundtables has made a number of recommendations for monitoring activity
from Canada in the future. For the present, the only avenue for providing
appropriate checks and balances is litigation. We can only hope that
Canadian courts will be open to an understanding of the crucial role that they
can play in addressing the social and political vulnerability of Indigenous
communities.

189. Dawn Paley, "Turning Down a Gold Mine" (7 February 2007), online: The Tyee,
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